After the end of the war in 2020, a number of representatives of the authorities and the opposition of Armenia declared the need to strengthen the strategic alliance with Russia. The need to deepen bilateral ties in the military-political sphere was especially emphasized. It was obvious that without Russian help it would not be possible to bring the combat capability of the Armed Forces of the republic to the level necessary to resist Azerbaijani aggression. A discussion also took place on the sidelines of the prospects for creating joint Armenian-Russian defense enterprises.
The prudent thoughts voiced by high-ranking officials remained predominantly statements instilling hope in the population of Artsakh for a secure future. In reality, Moscow has switched more to the conflict with Ukraine, and Yerevan has been puzzled by maintaining and increasing contacts with Paris, Brussels and Washington. Pashinyan took a concessionary position, making it clear to Aliyev that the last word in the battle for Artsakh would remain with him.
The current concern is Baku's desire to implement the Zangezur Corridor project, which would provide a land route between Azerbaijan and its exclave Nakhichevan.
After the surrender of Artsakh, Armenia also does not follow the path of consistent development of cooperation with Russia in the field of combat training and operational planning. Yerevan has also withdrawn from CSTO events. In relations with the Kremlin, things are really not that simple. It is necessary to clearly understand that open confrontation is not beneficial for Moscow and Baku in the near future. Russia has long been betting on uniting the Eurasian space under its nuclear dome...
However, Armenia’s cooperation exclusively with Western partners is not able to cover all the needs of the republic in ensuring its defense potential. By diversifying the country's security architecture, the leadership needs to competently avoid its degradation.
